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)EVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF WIRE TAPPING IN FEDERAL COURTS
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures of one's person, house, papers and effects,' has not, in
itself, been construed to render evidence obtained in violation of its provisions
inadmissible in criminal prosecutions against the person from whom such
evidence was seized.t But, by reading the Fourth Amendment in conjunction
with that clause of the Fifth Amendment which privileges one against being
"compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," a evidence
obtained in a search or seizure "unreasonable" in the sense of the Fourth
Amelidment is rendered inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions.4 En-
gaging in such judicial legislation, the Court created the "federal rule" which
permits admission of evidence despite its illegal olitention, in conformity with
common law principles,5 except where such admission violates rights guaranteed
to the defendant by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution.
I. U. S. Co.s'r, A. IRaI. IV provides, "The right of the people to be secure in
their lpersois. )itttsc, papers and effects, against unreasonalsle searches and seizures,
shall not be. violated aud to warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sUlpsorted by
oath or affirmtudiot. and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or things to he seized."
2. Ripiey v. State, Tex. Crim, Rep|. 539. 219 S. W. 463 (1920) ; State v. Wallace,
162 N. C. nj22. 78 S. E. I (1913): I lardesty v. United States. 168 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 6th
1909) : Bacot v. United States, 97 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 8th 1899), cert. denied, 175 U, S.
72'' (1899) :;ittlrtt v. People, 1.38 111. W)8. 27 N. F. 1085 (1891); Cotmitllwealt v.
Dana, 2 Mete. 329 ( Mass. 1841). lBut cf. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
3. U. S. Oi N-r. AM.NV0 V iprovides, "No pCrsoti shall be lieluI to answer for a
ca ital, r wilhctwise itftamous crime, titinles ott a prvselt t nt or itticttlt of a (;rand
Jury. except ill cases arising it the Ilaild or nt;val forces. or ill the Militia, when in
actual service ill time of War or plilic danger: nor shall any persotn be subject for the
sallie offelice t(, lie twice ]itt ill je ardy oF life (tr linltb nor chal/ he compellh'd it (mty
criminaul cas,* It ,e 4ilness 11.orijs) himself, itor le deprived otf life, liberty, or property,
w%'ithtttt due process ot law ; Ilir shall lirivate prtperly be taket for public ut C without
just compclsation." (Italics oors)
4. Bloyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886),
5. Jordani v. L.ewis, 14 East 31)6, 104 ng. ei. 618 (1740) : Legctt v, Tollervey,
14 East 302. 104 Fng. Rep. 617 (1811) (: omninwealth v. )aa. 2 Mete. 329 (Mass.
1841); State v. Flvittt, 36 N. H. 64 (1858): lmhodct v. 'eople, 40 Col. 142, 9(1 Pac.
608 (1907). (C rtr Slate v. Sheridan. 121 lIwa 164, 96 N. W. 73o (1903) : State v.
Slarnon, 73 Vt. 212. 50 Ail. 1(097 (1901). Cf. Underwoold v. St;tte. 13 G a. App. 2(16, 78
S. E. 1103 (1913). See Note. The ollrominqg of the Federal nul m Jviremtce Illegally
Obtained, 36 YALF L. J. 536 (1927).
6. Byars v. lUnited States, 273 U. S. 28 (192)) : I letIdersot v. UnlitCd States. 12
F.2'1 528 (C. C. A. 4th 1926) ; Murplty v. Unitel. Statc.. 285 FVed. 801 (C. C. A, 7th
1923); United States v. Talloct,, 277 Fed. 75 (\V. 1). Mo. 1922) ; I)tkes v. United
604
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These constitutional amendments have been invoked to exclude not only evi-
dence seized without warrant,7 but also to invalidate a statute authorizing the
issuance of warrants for the sole purpose of acquiring evidence to be used
against the person to whom the warrant was directed 8
In Olmstead v. United States,9 a much criticized decision, 10 the Court
ruled on the admissibility of evidence obtained by wire tapping for the first
time. Wire tapping was held not to be a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment as ". . . the search is to be of material things-the
person, the house, his papers or his effects. . . . The Amendment does not
forbid what was done here, There was no searching. There was no seizure.
The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only." 1,
The federal rule, then, does not operate to exclude evidence so obtained.
As an immediate reaction to the Ohustead decision, several bills aimed at
prohibiting the use of evidence obtained by wire tapping from admission in
federal courts were considered in Congress but were never passed." In 1934.
Congress, with the purpose of transferring jurisdiction over radio arid wire
communications to the recently created Federal Communications Commission,5
reenacted provisions of the Radio Act of 1927.'4 Section 605 15 provides,
States, 275 Fed. 142 (C. C. A. 4th 1921); United States v. Rykowski, 267 Fed. 866
(S. D. Ohio 1920) ; see Note, 150 A. L. R. 566 (1944).
7. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). Accord, United States v. Lefko-
witz, 285 U. S. 452 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925); Amos v.
United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920). But cf. Adams v. New
York, 192 U. S. 585 (1904).
8. See note 4 supro.
9. 277 U. S. 438 (1928). Accord, Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d 843 (C C.
A. 6th 1933) , Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d I (C. C. A. 5th 1933), cert. denied, 28S
U. S. 762 (1933); Morton v. United States, 60 F.2d 696 (C. C. A. 7th 1932), cert.
denied, 288 U. S. 607 (1933).
10. Notes, 27 MICH. L..Rrv. 78 (1928), 38 YALE L. 3. 77 (1928), 77 U: ole PA. L
Rev. 139 (1928).
1t. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 464 (1928).
.12. H. R. No. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929) (No information or evidence ob-
tained by or resulting from the tapping of telephone or telegraph wires . . . shall be
admitted as evidence in the courts of the United States in civil suits and criminal prose-
cutions). See also 1-f. R. No. 4139, SEN. 6061, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
13. SEN. REj. No. 781, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. (1934).
14. 44 STAT. 1172 (1927).
15. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934) provides that, "No person receiving or assisting in re-
ceiving, or transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign com-
munication by wire or radio shaill divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission
or reception, to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a
person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, or to
proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over
which the communicafion may be passed, or to the master of a ship under whom 'he is
serving, or in response to a subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or
on demand of other lawful authority; and no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, sub-
stance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person;
and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any inter-
state or foreign communication by wire or radio and use the sat,'e or any information
therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit. of another not entitled the:'..o;
and no person having received such intercepted communication or having beorne c-
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".I. no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any coin-
munication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, SulbStaiLce, purport,
effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." 16
Following the passage of this provision, arose the first Nardonc case.t"
The issue presented was whether, in view of Section 605, direct evidence
procured by a federal officer's interception of defendant's interstate telephone
communication was admissible in a federal criminal trial. Althotugh recognizing
that certain factors indicated Congress had not intended Section 605 to have
evidentiary effect,' 8 the Court in a widely discussed opinion.' 9 held that such
evidence was inadmissible as ". . . the plain words of Section 605, . . . direct
. . . that 'no person' shall divulge or publish the message or its substance to
'any person.' To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court
is to divulge the testimony." 20 In the second Nardoe case, 2' the Qourt clarified
and extended this rule by construing Section 605 to proscribe the use of
evidence acquired in an indirect manner from illegally intercepted messages
as well as original messages themselves, and that the accused must be given
an opportunity "to prove that a .substantial portion of the case against himn was
the fruit of the poisonous tree." 22
An allied problem was ruled on in the same term. In Weiss v. United
State, 25 wires had been tapped and the intercepted messages recorded on discs.
The Government urged that the messages, being intrastate in character, were
beyond the purview of Section 605, but to no avail. Intrastate comntillications
were not to be excluded from protection against interception and divulgence
where the same lines might be used for interstate communications. Subse-
quently, in Goldstein v. United States, 24 it became evident that the Court would
not further enlarge the scope of Section 605. The defendants were not parties
to the intercepted conversations. Their objection to the introduction of the
messages was overruled, it being concluded that the introduction of evidence
quainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same, or any
part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or publish
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto: provided, that this section shall not apply
to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utiltzing the contents of any radio communica-
tion broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general public,
or relating to ships in distress."
16. 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 501 (Supp. 1946) punishes the willful
and kmowing violation of § 605 by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for
a termn of not more than two years, or both.
17. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379 (1937).
1. Id. at 382.
1t . See 20 B. U. L. RFv. 362 (1940); 11 So. CALI?. L. Ray. 369 (1938) ; 26 ILL
lt.%it 1. 370 (1938): 86 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 436 (1938).
20. See note 17 stipro, at 382.-
21. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939),
22. Id. t! 341.
23. 308 U. S. 321 (1939).
N. 3Mo U. S. 114 (1942).
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obtained in violation of Section 605 could be objected to only by the parties to
the intercepted communication. It was reasoned that since the right to object
to the introduction of illegally obtained evidence is available only to that person
from whom it was so obtained, a fortiori, one not a party to the illegally inter-
cepted message may not object to its use in evidence. 25 Section 605 was further
restricted when, shortly thereafter, use of a detectaphone was not considered
as coming within the purview of the statuteM26
Summarized briefly, the Federal, Communications Act has been con-
strued to render inadmissible, upon proper objection by either of the parties
to the conversation,2 7 all evidence obtained directly 28 or indirectly 29 by means
of a wire tap. This result follows even where the messages are intrastate in
character, provided that they were transmitted through facilities forming a pos-
sible part of an interstate network.30 The protection thus afforded by Section
605 in the field of wire communications is somewhat analogous to protection
afforded one's person and property by the Fourth Amendment 31 but is more
extensive. The former affords greater security against the invasion of one's
right to privacy, for the Fourth Amendment protects one only against un-
reasonable searches and seizures; 32 whereas Section 605 forbids all un-
authorized interceptions, and makes no provision for the issuance of a warrant
authorizing wire tapping.38 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment protects
only against the search and seizure of federal agents ' 4 while under Section
605, protection is afforded against the use of wire tapped evidence in federal
courts secured by any person. 5
25. Id. at 121.
26. Goldman x. United States, 316 U. S. 129 (1942).
27. United States v. Polakoff, 112 F.2d 888 (C. C A. 2d 1940) (both parties to
conversations are "senders" within the meaning of Sec. 605, and the authorization of
both is necessary to render the evidence admissible) ; United States v. Fallon, 112 F.2d
894 (C. C. A. 2d 1940) ; contra, United States v. Yee Ping Jong, 26 F. Supp. 69 (W.
D. Pa. 1939).
28. United States v. Nardone, 302 U. S. 379 (1937); United States v. Bernava,
95 F.2d 310 (C. C. A. Zd 1938); Diamond v. United States, 94 F.2d 1012 (C. C. A.
6th 1938).
29. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338 (1939) ; see United States v. Goldstein,
120 F.2d 485, 488 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), aff'd 316 U. S. 114 (1942).
30. United States v. Weiss, supra; Sablonsky v. United States, 101 F.Zd 183 (C.
C. A. 3d 1938) ; United States v. Klee, 101 F.2d 191 (C. C. A. 3d 1938); Diamond v.
United States, 108 F.2d 859 (C. C. A. 6th 1938) ; but see United States v. Bonanrzi, 94
F.2d 570, 572 (C. C. A. 2d 1938). Contra: Valli v. United States, 94 F.2d 687 (C. C. A.
1st 1938).
31. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 383 (1937).
32. See note I supra.
33. See note 15 supra.
34. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921) ; Weeks v. United States, 232
U. . 333 (1914) (Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to individual miscondurc of
state officers).
35. See notes 15 and 20 supra.
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II
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF WIRE TAPPING IN STATE COURTS
The general problem of the admissibility in state courts of evidence ob-
tained in an illegal manner is essentially different from that in the federal
courts. The federal rule admits evidence despite its illegal source except
where such admission would violate rights guaranteed to the defendant by the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments; 6 but such amendments are not applicable
to the states,37 nor are they made so by operation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.38 Even so, a large number of states have voluntarily adopted the federal
rule. 9 Such adoption does not affect the admissibility of evidence obtained by
wire tapping for, as in the federal courts, wire tapping is not considered an un-
reasonable search or seizure. 40 Objections to the admission of wire tapped
evidence in the state courts have been posed primarily on statutory prohibitions.
State statutes which might bear on the admissibility of evidence obtained
by wire tapping are of several different types. The acts longest in existence
do not deal with wire tapping but are concerned with acts of trespass and
malicious mischief upon the facilities of telegraph and telephone companies.41
A more comprehensive type of statute forbids any form of unlawful interference
with communications or distortion of the message even though such inter-
ference does not constitute a trespass or malicious mischief.' 2 Most of the
statutes attempt to ban unequivocally all wire tapping and, to this end, make
any violation of their provisions misdemeanors. 43 No cases have becn found
36. See notes 5 and 6 supra. For treatment of the law on illegal search and seizure,
see Notes, 58 YALE L. J. 144 (1948), 36 YALe L. J. 536 (1927).
37. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); accord, Spies v. Illinois, 123
U. S. 131 (1887) ; cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
38. Twining v. New Jersey, supra; Palko v. Connecticut, supra: People v. Defore,
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), cert. denied, 270 U. S. 657 (1920).
39. Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire 7'apping, 32 CoRn. L. Q. 514, 525 (1947);
Note, 58 YALe L. J. 144, 150 (1948).
40. Leon v. State, 180 Md. 279, 27 A.2d 706 (1941), cert. denied sub. nona Neal
v. State, 316 U. S. 680 (1942) ; Hitzelberger v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 At. 605 (1938)
Young v. Young, 56 R. I. 401, 285 Ati. 901 (1936).
41. Georgia's statute, for example, provides that, "Any person who shall wilfully
destroy or in any way injure the posts, wires, or fixtures of a magnetic telegraph
company, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." GA. CoOP. ANN. § 26-8114 (1936).
42. "Every person who unlawfully or maliciously takes down, removes, injures,
interferes with, or obstructs any wire or poles erected by any telegraph or telephone
company, or maintained by proper authority for the purpose of transmitting intelligence,
or any part thereof, or any insulator or cross arms, appurtenance or apparatus con-
nected therewith, or unlawfully severs or in any way unlawfully interferes with any
wire, cable, or current thereof, upon conviction shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor
and punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty days, or by fine not exceeding
one hundred dollars." S. C. CoDE ANN;. § 1201 (1942).
43. "Every person who shall make a connection, by wire or otherwise, with any
telegraph or telephone wires, not owned or leased by him, for the purpose of obtaining
information or listening to the transmission of telegraphic dispatches or telephone mes-
sages to which he is not entitled; and any person who wrongfully obtains or attempts
to obtain any knowledge of a telegraphic or telephone message by connivance with a
clerk, operator, messenger or other employe of a telegraph or telephone company, or
who being such clerk, operator, messenger, or other employe, wilfully divulges to anyone
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wherein state courts have construed such laws so as to render inadmissible
evidence obtained by wire tapping. 44 The Florida statute prohibits not only
the interception of the communication, but also divulgence of its contents,'5
but has not as yet been interpreted by the courts.
Whoever, without the consent of the owner thereof, destroys, damages,
or in any way injures any telegraph or telephone poles, cables, wires,
fixtures, or other apparatus, equipment, or appliances; or obstructs, im-
pedes, or impairs the service of any telegraph or telephone line or lines,
or the transmission of messages thereover; or attaches any unauthorized
device or equipment to any telegraph or telephone line or instrument, or
taps or connects, directly or indirectly, by wire or any other means what-
soever, to or with any telegraph or telephone line so as to hear, or be in
position to hear, or to enable any other person to hear or be in position
to hear, for any use or purpose whatsoever, any message going
over said line, or for the purpose of receiving, or enabling any other person
to receive any unauthorized service over said line, or uses, or attempts to
use, in any manner or for any purpose, or communicates in any way, any
information so obtained; or aids, agrees with, employs, or conspires with,
any person to do or cause to be done any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned;
shall be punished by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprison-
ment not exceeding six months.
A recent New York statute, providing a procedure for supervised wire
tapping, may presage a new trend in wire tapping statutes.46 The statute
authorizes the issuance of orders permitting wire tapping upon oath of
specified state officials that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of a crime may be thereby obtained. In addition, the person or persons whose
communications are to be intercepted must be described with particularity.
To further discourage private wire tapping, New York has recently amended
its penal code to provide that it shall be a misdemeanor to possess any device
commonly used for the interception of telephone communications under cir-
cunstances evincing an intent unlawfully to employ such for wire tapping.
47
These statutes attempt to serve the need 48 for laws which both encourage
but the person for whom it was intended the contents or nature of a telegraphic or
telephone. message or dispatch, of which contents he or she may in any manner become
possessed, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars." ALA. CODE ANti. tit. 48,
§ 414 (1940).
44. These statutes are discussed in detail in Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapp;ng,
33 COV. L. Q. 73 (1947).
45. FLA. STAT. § 822.10 (1941).
46. N. Y. PENAL LAW.§ 813-a (1942).
47. "A person who has in his possession any device, contrivance, machine or ap-
paratus designed or commonly used for wire tapping or the interception of telephone'
communications under circumstances evincing an intent to unlawfully use or employ
or allow the same to be so used or employed for wire tapping or interception of telephone
communications, or knowing the same are intended to be so used, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and if he has been previously convicted of any crime, he shall be guilty
of a felony." N. Y. PENAL LAW § 552-a (1949).
48. See 8 WrGMoRE, EvIt FcE § 2184 b (3d ed. 1940) ; Plumb, Illegal Enforcemena
of the Law, 24 CosN. L. Q. 337 (1939); Comment, 53 HnAv. L. Rsv. 863 (1940). The
New York legislature has apparently agreed that wire tapping ,hould be utilized in
crime prevention by providing for supervised tapping. In 1!0'8 a ccnst,tntional pr,,.' .ion
was adopted: "The right of the people to be secure against unreasonabi ,.,tcr., ion
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
competent law enforcement and prevent abuse of the individual's right of
privacy by unauthorized persons. As previously mentioned, Section 605 of
the Federal Communications Act absolutely prohibits all wire tapping. If
this provision is construed as a restriction upon state courts, the New York
law providing for legalized wire tapping would be tinconstitutional."
The question whether the Federal Communications Act has the effect
of rendering evidence obtained in violation of its provisions inadmissible in
state courts has been debated. 0 The wording of the statute itself might justify
the assumption that its provisions are applicable to state courts, for the clause
states only that divulging information obtained by wire tapping is a criminal
offense. Such divulgence, it may be argued, is unlawful even in state courts,
for "to recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to
divulge the testimony," 51 the very act seemingly prohibited by Section 605.
In a well reasoned article, Bernstein points out that "the place where the
criminal act occurs is of no significance even though that place happens to be
a court created by a sovereign state, The federal law is not seeking to impose
a rule of evidence upon the state courts. It does have this result, but it is merely
the incidental and natural consequence of'a crime which is a proper subject
of federal legislation.
' 52
The courts of California have tacitly agreed with this premise in a number
of recent cases " in which the applicability of Section 605 was impliedly assumed
but the wire tapped evidence admitted because the plaintiff, in each case, was
not within the-purview of the statute. In opposition are those holdings of the
Maryland court 54 wherein the view has been expressed that the Federal
Communications Act was not intended to limit the power of the state courts to
determine the admissibility of evidence so obtained. 55
The Maryland cases 56 denying the ability of Congress to effect procedural
changes in state courts have been substantiated by holdings of other states in
ot telephone and telegraph communications 'shall not be violated, and ex parte orders
or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable ground
to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the particular
means of communications, and particularly describing the person or persons whose com-
munications are to be intercepted and the purpose thereof." N. Y. CoNST.. Art. I, § 12.
See Note, 23 ILL. L. REv. 377 (1928) suggesting a like procedure for federal officers.
49. See Bernstein, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 37 ILL. L. REv. 99, 108, n. 23
(1942) discussing this possibility. See also Ernst, Detectives -In Your Parlor, New York
Herald Tribune, May 29, 1949, § 8, p. 5.
50. See Bernstein, op. cit. supro, at 107 (1942) ; Rosenzweig, op. cit., 33 CORN.
L. Q. 73, 78 (1947), Notes, 18 N. C. L. REv. 229 (1940), 34 ILL. L. Rev. 758 (1940).
51. Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 382 (1937).
52. Bernstein, op. cit. 37 ILL. L. REv. 99, 108 (1942).
53. People v. Onofrio, 65 Cal. App.2d. 584, 151 P.2d 158 (1944); People v. Vert-
litb, 22 Cal.2d 193, 137 P.2d 437 (1943) ; People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d 169, 137 P.2d 1
(1943), appeal dismissed Kelley v. State of Calif., 320 U. S. 715 (1943).
54, Hubin v. State, 180 Md. 279, 23 A.2d 706 (1942); Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547,
3 A.2d 753 (1939) ; Hitzelberger v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 Atl. 605 (1938).
55. Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A.2d 753 (1939)-
56, See note 54 supra.
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an analogous sit Vation. Most authorities have held that a federal statute,
requiring the use of Government stamps on particular instruments before they
could be used in evidence "in any court," does not have the effect of rendering
documents which fail to comply with the statutory standards inadmissible in
state courts.57 Conversely, in the leading case expressing the minority view, 58
the court, while agreeing with the proposition that Congress cannot regulate
the competency of evidence in state courts, nevertheless, held that the purpose
of such a stamp statute was to prevent the use of an unstamped document as
evidence until the delinquent had paid his tax, not to make rules of evidence.
The provision of the statute rendering unstamped documents inadmissible as
evidence "in any court" does, therefore, include state as well as federal courts.
The view of the majority seems to be based upon a failure to realize that
". the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action .... The nation, on those subjects on which.it can
act, must necessarily bind its component parts " To this effect the Sixth
Article of the Constitution provides that the laws of the United States
made in pursuance of the Constitution shall be binding on the judges in every
state. 0 Accordingly, the Supreme Court, holding that a state court could not
refuse to enforce a federal penal statute wherein Congress had specified con-
current jurisdiction in state and federal courts, stated that a policy created by
Congress in the exercise of its constitutionally provided powers is as much
a policy of. the states as if the act had emanated from their own legislatures
and should be respected in the courts of the states.6"
In the light of these decisions, the contention that Congress cannot create
rules of evidence as incident to legislation in enumerated federal fields is open
to question. Indeed, Congress has created rules which have been held restric-
tions upon state courts. The Bankruptcy Act which prohibits the use of in-
formation disclosed in bankrupty proceedings has been held to exclude the
use of such evidence in state courts.' 2 Furthermore, the procedure followed
57. Davis v. Evans, 133 N. C. 320; 45 S. E. 643 (1903) ; Wide v. Foss, 96 Me.
230, 52 Atl. 640 (1902); Garland v. Gaines, 73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl. 19 (1901); Small
v. Slocumb, 112 Ga. 279, 37 S. E. 481 (1900) ; Knox v. Rossi, 25 Nev. 96, 57 Pac. 179
(1899); Trowbridge v. Addoms, 23 Colo. 518, 48 Pac. 535 (1897).
58. Chartiers and Robinson Turnpike Co. v. McNamara, 72 Pa. 278 (1872).
59. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405 (1819).
60. U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI § 2 provides, "This Constitution, and the laws of the
United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the authprity of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Consti-
tution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In accord, it has been
held that substantive rights acquired under a federal law are enforceable in both state
and federal courts. Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947); Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co.
v. Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1915). Accord: McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 292
U. S. 230 (1934).
61. Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. (Second Employer's Liability Cases),
223 U. S. 1 (1911). Accord: Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947); Clafin v. Houseman,
93 U. S. 130 (1876) ; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1879).
62. People v. Lay, 193 Mich. 17, 159 N. W. 299 (1916).
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A recent discussion in the Yale Law Journal 6 between J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Profs. Emerson and
Helfeld of the Yale Law School has attracted wide attention. Statements by
the latter that agents of the F. B. I. were reputedly engaging in wire tapping"
were admitted as true by Mr. Hoover,60 with the defense that such tapping
was done only in cases involving espionage, sabotage, grave risks to internal
security, or when human lives were in jeopardy.
The more specific question of the applicability of Section 605 to the
various state courts arose in a New York case 67 which received nationwide
publicity. Professional gamblers were convicted by the use of wire tapped
evidence, secured in conformity with the state statute, of the attempted bribery
of two members of the New York Giants professional football team, Merle
Hapes and Frank Filchock. The constitutionality of the New York statute
was challenged by the defendants in an appeal to the Supreme Court, thus
placing the applicability of 605 to the states squarely in issue. But the situation
is still unclarified, for in a four-four decision the ruling of the lower court
was affirmed without comment. 8
It is clear, then, that Section 605, as of this date, has not terminated
wire tapping either by federal agents or state officers. The final word as to
its ultimate effect in this direction still remains with the Supreme Court.
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